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Jesting Pilate

by Carl E. Schneider

What is Truth? said jesting Pilate; and
would not stay for an answer.
-Francis Bacon, OfTruth

I

have two goals this month. First, to
examine a case that's in the news.
Second, to counsel skepticism in
reading news accounts of cases.
Recently, I was talking with an admirable scholar. He said that transplant
surgeons sometimes kill potential
donors to obtain their organs efficiently.
He added, "This isn't just an urban legend-there's a real case in California."
A little research turned up California
v. Roozrokh. A little Googling found
stories from several reputable news
sources. Their headlines indeed intimated that a transplant surgeon had tried to
kill a patient to get transplantable organs. CNN.com: "Doctor accused of
hastening death for patient's organs."
Time: "Organ Donation[:] Did a Doctor Speed a Patient's Death?" The New
York Times: "Surgeon Accused of Speeding a Death to Get Organs." These
headlines (and the stories) implied, I
thought, that a prosecutor had charged
a surgeon with doing something intended to kill a patient and that the patient had consequently died.
I then discovered (with less journalistic help) that there had been a preliminary hearing, a ruling, and a judicial
opinion. 1 The opinion revealed that the
surgeon had actually been charged with
three felonies:
(1) "[D]ependent adult abuse ...
by willfully causing and permitting
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Ruben Navarro [the patient] to be
placed in a situation in which his
health was endangered by the prescription of excessive amounts of
morphine and Ativan, and/or by
the introduction of Betadine into
his stomach."
(2) Violating a law that prohibits
"willfully mingl[ing] any poison or
harmful substance with any food,
drink, medicine, or pharmaceutical
product or . . . willfully plac[ing]
any poison or harmful substance in
any spring, well reservoir, or public
water supply, where the person
knows or should have known that
the same would be taken by any
human being to his or her injury."

(3) Violating a statute which said
that a "prescription for a controlled
substance shall only be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose."
These were not the homicide charges
I had expected. The headlines spoke of
"hastening" or "speeding" a death. But
"speeding" a death is murder. It does
not matter that the victim is dying anyway or that the victim would not have
died had he been healthier. Hastening a
death means being the proximate cause
of the death, and that's murder. So if the
surgeon had administered drugs to
cause the patient to die, why no murder
charge? Because the drugs did not actually kill the patient? Perhaps. But if the
surgeon intended that they should kill,
then the charge would presumably have
been attempted murder.

Reading the opinion brought more
surprises. The judge dismissed the second (mingling poison) charge. The
statute did "not apply where, as here,
the allegedly harmful substance is introduced into a patient as part of a medical
procedure, instead of being 'taken by
any human being' by voluntarily (and
typically unknowingly) ingesting it
along with food, drink, or medicine."
(In addition, the statute's legislative history "indicate[d] that this law was
passed in response to incidents involving the poisoning of innocent victims
who unknowingly consumed contaminated water supplies, tainted Halloween
treats, or poisoned Tylenol products.")
The judge also dismissed the third
(legitimate medical purpose) charge. A
"plain reading of the statute" showed
that it was inapplicable, since it said,
"An order for controlled substances for
use by a patient in a ... licensed hospital shall be exempt from all requirements of this article." (In addition, the
legislative history suggested that "the
statute was designed to target 'prescription mills' and practitioners operating
outside of the hospital setting.")
The court did permit the first (dependent-adult abuse) count to go to
trial. That count was markedly less serious than the homicide charge that the
press reports had implied. To get a conviction, the prosecutor did not even
have to show that the defendant had intended to harm the patient, only that he
was "criminally negligent" (that his conduct was "such a departure from what
would be the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent or careful person ... as to be
incompatible with a proper regard for
human life ... or [to show] an indifference to consequences").
Of course, that's bad enough. So was
the surgeon guilty? What had he actually done? The opinion said that for
"many years" Mr. Navarro had "suffered
from adrenoleukodystrophy, which
causes damage to the nervous system
and muscular system." On January 29,
2006, respiratory and pulmonary arrest
had led to "a severe anoxic brain injury."
He was admitted to a hospital comatose
and with a "poor" prognosis "for survival." A month later, his mother "gave
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consent to withdraw life support from
her son" and to make him an organ
donor. "Because Mr. Navarro was not
brain dead, it was determined that the
transplant procedure to be used would
be Donation After Cardiac Death
(DCD), which requires withdrawal of
life support leading to death prior to recovery of the organs." The surgeon "did
not make or participate in making any
of these decisions."
The court commented that the defendant "was less than one year out of
his organ transplant fellowship." He
had "observed . . . one DCD procedure" but had never "been the primary
surgeon'' in one. (The procedure is unusual.) He had been "accompanied" by
"the Chief of Kidney Transplant
Surgery at Kaiser Permanente," who
had "never performed or assisted a
DCD procedure." Furthermore, the
"transplant coordinator" (apparently a
nurse) "had never been a primary transplant coordinator at a DCD procurement." There had "never been a DCD
procurement" at the hospital, and
"none of the hospital staff who participated ... had any training or experience
in DCD procedures." Finally, the hospital had no "written DCD protocol,"
and there was no "national DCD protocol."
When the two surgeons arrived,
"there was no attending physician . . .
caring for Mr. Navarro." There was "no
medication for comfort care" in the operating room. And "[w]hen the attending physician finally arrived in the Operating Room, all other participants
were already there, and she failed to understand that she was the responsible
physician in charge of ordering medications for, and attending to the care of,
Ruben Navarro."
At this point, the court's narrative
collapses because the evidence becomes
contradictory. For example, the transplant coordinator testified that she told
the attending physician that she (the
physician) would be responsible for the
patient's care until he died and that she
"understood this." The attending physician denied this testimony.
The confusion about the drugs given
the patient was worse. One witness said
July-August 2008

medications were administered four
times, another witness said three times,
yet another witness said one time, and
the fourth witness said she "was present
for one administration, but heard that
there had been another." One witness
said a total of 180 milligrams of morphine and eighty of Ativan were administered, another witness said the figures
were 150 and sixty, a third witness said
she didn't know, and the last witness
saw fifty milligrams of morphine and
twenty of Ativan given. Two witnesses
said Betadine had been ordered by a
transplant surgeon, but neither witness
could say which one. The experienced
surgeon said it was not he. Everyone
else "in the Operating Room denied
observing or hearing about the introduction of Betadine, despite (at least in
some cases) their greater involvement."
And "no one charted the administration
of medications in the Operating
Room." Nor was it clear who had actually ordered the morphine and Ativan,
partly because a doctor caring for the
patient had earlier prescribed those
drugs "in quantities of up to 10 mgs.
every 15 minutes, on an 'as needed'
basis (as determined by hospital nursing
staff)."
Whatever drugs were given, the patient (apparently) survived a number of
hours after life support was withdrawn.
(There was testimony that the patient
had been receiving narcotics "for a significant period of time, and likely had
developed a tolerance to morphine.")
Even had the evidence been less contradictory, we would not know what actually happened. Preliminary hearings
determine whether there is enough evidence to justify a trial; they do not find
facts. The defendant did not have to
present his own case and (apparently)
did not. So the court's story was necessarily partial in both senses-incomplete and one-sided. In particular,
"[t]here was no evidence ... on Defendant's subjective intent." Nor (apparently) did the defendant call expert witnesses. So the defendant's lawyer could
plausibly warn that after the trial "a
great many people, lay and medical[,]
will realize they have been significantly
misinformed."

For good reasons and bad, journalism about law is often mistaken and
misleading. For example, only one
newspaper (the Wall Street Journa~ accurately described any case I worked on
during my year at the Supreme Court.
And while some of the reporters who
call to ask about legal issues are impressive, many others prefer a good story to
good information. Journalists report on
the "newsworthy'' but ignore the vast
bulk of law, and the odder and gaudier
the legal development, the more newsworthy it can be. Journalists rarely have
training in the law, and they have scant
time to educate themselves about an
issue. Furthermore, law is hard to cover,
not least because it is so fragmented.
There are over fifty jurisdictions, each
with legions of multifarious legal actors.
And most legal events are just chapters
in a long saga whose ultimate meaning
emerges slowly.
Roozrokh exemplifies many of these
problems. As first-year law students
quickly learn, even a single fact can
transform a case. At this point, the legal
system has only begun to gather and analyze evidence. Some of the facts asserted are certainly wrong, and new facts
will surely emerge. News accounts of
the case seem uncritically to imply, and
readers about it seem uncritically to
infer, that it fits the most obvious category-a surgeon killing his patient for
his organs. Perhaps it does. Yet it could
also be, for example, a case about how
inexperience, anxiety, and disorder lead
to mistakes. After all, error and
bungling are far more common than
murder. So we need to wait until the
case has finished its judicial journey and
to scrutinize news reports skeptically
before we draw legal and social lessons
from Roozrokh. As Sherlock Holmes
warned, "It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one
begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts."
l. Ruling After Preliminary Hearing, Case
No F 405885, Superior Court of California,
County of San Luis Obispo (March 19,
2008).
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